MSc. Ghada Dessouky

Research Assistant

Mornewegstraße 30
D-64293 Darmstadt

Building: S4|14
Phone:+49 (0)6151 / 16 - 25320



Since November 2014

Research Assistant

at CYSEC and Technische Universität DarmstadtGermany


Research Assistant

at Institute of Parallel and Distributed Systems, Universität Stuttgart, Germany


MSc. Information Technology

(specialization in Embedded Systems Engineering) - INFOTECH Master’s Program

at Universität Stuttgart, Germany.

SS 2009

Bachelor thesis: DAAD Exchange Scholarship

“Design of Transconductor-based CAB for FPAA in 90nm CMOS Technology”
at Institute of Microelectronics, Universität Ulm, Germany

2005 - 2010

BSc. of Electronics Engineering

at Faculty of Information Engineering and Technology – German University in Cairo (GUC), Egypt

 Research Interests

  • Hardware-assisted security architectures
  • Embedded and digital systems design
  • Hardware/Software co-design
  • FPGA-based computing

Open HiWi Positions & Theses

We have open positions in the following projects:

  • Hardware-assisted security architectures and processor extensions
  • Using machine learning for anomaly detection
  • Verification of security properties of hardware designs

If you are familiar with digital design or machine learning and want to become part of one of our projects and participate in state-of-the-art research, please send us your application (CV, certificate(s) and any supporting documents) via email.




ATRIUM: Runtime Attestation Resilient Under Memory Attacks

Author Shaza Zeitouni, Ghada Dessouky, Orlando Arias, Dean Sullivan, Ahmad Ibrahim, Yier Jin, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Date November 2017
Kind Inproceedings
Book title2017 International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD'17)
LocationIrvine, California, US
Research Areas S2, CROSSING, System Security Lab, P3, CYSEC
Abstract Remote attestation is an important security service that allows a trusted party (verifier) to verify the integrity of the software running on a remote and potentially compromised device (prover). The security of existing remote attestation schemes relies on the assumptions that attacks are software-only and the prover's code cannot be modified at runtime. However, in practice, these schemes can be bypassed in a stronger and more realistic adversary model with physical access to (either off-chip or on-chip) code memory and is hereby capable of controlling and modifying code memory to attest benign code but execute malicious code instead -- leaving the underlying system vulnerable to Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) attacks. In this paper, we first show how to successfully launch TOCTOU attacks on some recently proposed attestation schemes by exploiting physical access to code memory. Then we present the design and proof-of-concept implementation of SMARTER, the first practical runtime remote attestation system that securely attests both the code's binary and its execution in the mentioned stronger adversary model. SMARTER provides resilience against both software- and hardware-based TOCTOU attacks, while incurring minimal area and performance overhead.
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Previous Publications

Adaptive Dynamic On-Chip Memory Management for FPGA-based Reconfigurable Architectures
Ghada Dessouky, Michael J. Klaiber, Donald G. Bailey, Sven Simon
In: 24th International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), Munich, Germany, September 2014

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